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 Abstract—Establishing a root-of-trust is a key early step in 
establishing trust throughout the lifecycle of a device, notably by 
attesting the running software. A key technique is to use 
hardware security in the form of specialised modules or 
hardware functions such as TPMs. However, even if a device 
supports such features, other steps exist that can compromise the 
overall trust model between devices being manufactured until 
decommissioning. In this paper, we discuss how blockchains, and 
smart contracts in particular, can be used to harden the overall 
security management both in the case of existing hardware-
enhanced security or when only software attestation is possible. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
NY aspect in security will in some way and at some point 
be tied to a chain of trust whereby the trust of the overall 
process or system is as secure as its weakest link. For 
example, in any key management scheme, key storage and 
distribution is typically the most complex step and requires a 
number of assumptions. Smart devices and the Internet-of-
Things (IoT) add the new challenge of location considering 
that many use-cases include a device on untrusted premises 
and physically accessible. A smart thermostat at home is a 
straightforward example: one can only trust the hardware and 
the software it runs as long there are guarantees nobody had 
physical access to it in the past and there are no software 
vulnerabilities that can be remotely exploited. This brings us 
to hardware-enhanced software security. The only way, 
arguably, of verifying (or attesting) the current software image 
it is using is by means of special hardware functions such as 
processors using Trusted Execution Environments or a 
dedicated cryptographic module, e.g., Trusted Platform 
Module (TPM) from TGC [1].  
A typical TPM offers a number of basic cryptographic 
services directly embedded in electronics. For example, it can 
hold in isolation, directly in the hardware microelectronics, a 
set of keys and is able to perform de/encryption of messages 
without the keys ever being exposed. Another service is a 
persistent memory that can hold, for example, signatures of 
the software that is used to boot the device while disabling key 
parts of the hardware until the verification is complete. 
Combining such features, a strong root-of-trust is established 
in the sense that, if one is able to securely associate such 
isolated keys to a physical device throughout its lifecycle, one 
can be sufficiently sure any underlying security process or 
protocol has not been compromised. 
There is however two aspects that weaken this chain of 
trust. On one hand, devices almost never work in isolation 
and, in a typical IoT use-case, there will be some gateway 
nearby the device and further services provided by a Cloud, 
generally speaking. Further, not all devices will have an on-
board TPM or similar hardware-based functions. This could 
be, for example, due to cost, complexity or constraints on 
resources. The second fact that weakens the chain of trust is 
the handling of the device from factory until activation. 
Commissioning a remote device needs a trusted process in 
itself which, again, is based on more or less weak 
assumptions. For example, the device needs to arrive in a 
trusted state (trusting the supply chain), then provisioned 
(typically involving creating keys) and finally be attested at 
least once immediately before being activated for production. 
On the other hand, the device also needs to trust what it is 
receiving from the Cloud counterpart. Striking examples is 
receiving firmware updates or the device being an actuator and 
receiving commands. This is a simpler problem as, typically, 
there is no limitation of resources and hardware security is 
available. Furthermore, and central to this paper, whereas 
devices need to be assumed to operate from an untrusted 
location, one can expect the cloud infrastructure to be 
physically secure and subject to structured security workflows. 
This paper discusses such chains of trust for 
smart/embedded devices and discusses the use of blockchain 
technologies, and Smart Contracts, to mitigate such 
weaknesses. Our strategy is to use Blockchains’ immutability 
and auditing properties and use them in secure attestation, 
verification and overall management. Specifically, we propose 
a scheme that offers two features. First, we use smart contracts 
to provide an emulation of hardware cryptographic services 
similar to a remote and virtual TPM. In an extreme case, one 
can verify the device has not been tampered with but at the 
cost of making the device unusable until manual and 
comprehensive verification or re-provisioning. The second 
feature of our scheme is that we use the underlying blockchain 
to provide a secure message bus over which devices and cloud 
can communicate sensitive information such as public keys. 
In Section II we review key concepts of hardware and 
firmware security and the concept of Smart Contracts over 
Blockchains. In Section III we lay out our Device and Threat 
models and we align with the common lifecycle of a device. In 
Section IV we discuss our approach to the problem that we 
evaluate in Section V. Section VI concludes our paper and 
discusses future work. 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
In this section we review related work on Trusted Software 
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 and Smart Contracts in the context of Internet-of-Things. 
A. Trusted Software 
Hardware-enhanced trusted software execution has seen 
different proposals [2] that range in complexity, typically 
categorized by the ability of only performing attestation 
functions or the ability to run complex software in an isolated 
environment. TPMs is one of such and are a technology 
standardized by the Trusted Computing Group [1]. It has been 
used in many areas but with mixed adoption since whereas 
virtually all cloud servers, many laptops and mobile phones 
have one, embedded devices such as those used in Wireless 
Sensor Networks (WSN) or IoT do not, for cost or 
implementation complexity reasons. TPMs can be used in any 
task that relies on handling secret material, such as 
authentication [3][4]. Whenever there is no TPM available, a 
root-of-trust needs to be established in other ways [5] even if 
the trust level may be reduced [6]. Alternatives include 
software-based attestations such as the one proposed by 
Seshadri et al [7] that relies on loading trusted software in 
memory and sending a signed footprint to an external verifier. 
Software attestation is however challenging to implement in 
practice and often depends on the specific architecture of the 
device to be feasible [8]. 
Note, however, that, when looking at the workflow and the 
device lifecycle, secure management of keys still shows gaps 
even with hardware security. A good example is that a manual 
enrolment phase (such as simply connecting a cable) is 
typically required where keys and secure boot measurements 
(cryptographic hashes) are attested and recorded to build a 
baseline and used in later comparison. This verified binding 
between cryptographic material, identity and function of the 
device is part of the problem we address in our paper using 
Smart Contracts. 
B. Blockchains and Smart Contracts in IoT 
Blockchains are a recent technology that cleverly enables 
trustless, distributed and open verification applications by, 
normally, heavily using computing power. In its original form 
(seen in Bitcoin), data is stored in blocks, which are linked 
together using strong cryptography as they are created, thus 
forming a chain of records whose immutability increases as 
new blocks are added. Every new set of records, or a block, is 
verified by many nodes (the consensus layer) and subject to a 
resource-intensive cryptographic process (mining) that is 
similar to brute-forcing a hash thus providing strong 
assurances that, after enough time elapsed (several blocks of 
data and concatenated hashes), the data cannot be changed. 
Smart Contracts take this concept further by allowing not only 
records but also code to be executed. In its original form, data 
and code is publicly auditable. Since the information is open 
and tamper-resistant, the system is trustless since any 
unauthorized or unexpected modifications, at the time of 
submission, are visible to every participant. Applications to 
IoT and trusted execution are thus immediate [8] and they 
include enhanced security, privacy and identity [10], 
verification of the supply chain [8], distribution of firmware 
updates (taking advantage of both assurances of integrity and 
distributed topology of nodes) [11][12] or enhancing trust in 
Industrial IoT [12] or coordinating business workflows as in 
electricity co-generation [14].  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work 
exploring the use of Smart Contracts in designing generic 
hardware-emulated, security services, joining trusted and 
untrusted software, and using Blockchains as a trusted 
communication channel. In other words, we aim at using 
Smart Contracts to either enhance or create Roots-of-Trust. 
Boudguiga et al [12] and Novo [15] propose architectures to 
perform a specific task such as verification of IoT updates or 
performing access control, typically by designing a blockchain 
architecture with which nodes will fully integrate instead of 
using it as service. Further, they do not use smart contracts and 
use the blockchain as immutable and verifiable storage in a 
custom blockchain architecture. A similar proposal is the case 
of Machado and Frohlich [17], but using smart contracts and 
different consensus algorithms, who propose an integrity 
verification architecture based on blockchains and fit for IoT, 
constrained devices and real-time applications. Wu et al [16] 
discuss a related problem of using a blockchain as an out-of-
band communication channel, a concept we also use, but for 
authentication. 
III. THREAT MODEL 
For end-to-end and continuous trust, the device must be 
secured across all stages in its lifecycle. We start by 
introducing a generic threat model that is aligned with a 
general lifecycle. We then discuss the requirements our 
approach expects to meet along with identifying limitations 
and in the next section we elaborate on our proposals. 
A. Device Lifecycle 
We start by considering a generic lifecycle of devices. This 
allows to extract a threat model and design our architecture 
and smart contracts. We assume a device goes through the 
following stages, from manufacturing to disposal: 
1. Factory – the device is manufactured and an early 
firmware (or bootloader) is installed. This first layer of 
firmware which, beyond accessory functions (such as 
power-on tests), is the software component that will 
load further components up to an Operating Systems 
and user applications. Being the first software layer, it 
must support and undergo full verification as all further 
verifications will depend on it. 
2. Supply Chain Handling – The device is then physically 
distributed and may be handled by several parties until 
it arrives to the last owner (e.g., end user or service 
manager). There may be the case where other parties 
install a new firmware that needs to be also verified by 
the end user. 
3. Commissioning – The device may be now configured, 
physically installed, provisioned and integrated with 
the cloud at its final location. All these steps may be 
remote or by an end-user. Physical attacks are possible.  
The device is further registered and integrated with a 
 Cloud service. This requires, at least, verification of 
firmware, generation of root keys and (possibly) a 
unique identifier for the device. Note that, for the 
verification part, it is desirable to commission a device 
remotely with little or no local effort and allowing for 
device/user unlinkability, similar to Intel’s SDO 
approach [18] that uses group keys instead of per 
device. 
4. In-Service – The device is now ready to send and 
receive data or commands. At this point, both hardware 
and software needs to be verified and protocols used 
should be secure. 
5. Maintenance – The device undergoes maintenance 
stages such as software updates and reconfigurations. 
Note this stage repeats in time and interleaves the In-
Service stage. 
6. Decommissioning – the device is removed from service 
and is disposed, reinstalled or repurposed. 
 
Considering these stages, a hardware-based attestation, such 
as a TPM, is invaluable to effectively create a state of trust 
over which trust in all other dependencies can be built on. 
There are however aspects that a TPM cannot address. 
Furthermore, as discussed, it is not possible to have a TPM on 
every device so other scenarios and solutions need to be 
considered, up to accepting service from untrusted hardware. 
The next subsection presents a list of threats per stage in the 
lifecycle of the device. 
B. Threat Model 
The key threats are the following: 
1. The device was compromised during manufacturing, 
which includes hardware trojans or modified firmware. 
2. Taking advantage of physical access to the device, it is 
modified during handling across the supply chain or in 
later phases which includes the end-user.  
3. A different device altogether was delivered. 
4. During commissioning or maintenance, the device is 
installed using compromised software.  
5. Illegitimate modification of the software by a 
legitimate user because of physical access after being 
installed. 
6. Insecure management of secret material during 
Commissioning phase such as keys and identity of the 
device were correctly generated by a legitimate party 
but storage and/or transmission was insecure. 
7. Data received may not be from the device or may have 
been intercepted or modified in-flight. 
8. Device receives data from malicious parties that are 
able to spoof the cloud services which includes 
compromised firmware and configurations. 
 
Other threats may be considered (e.g., privacy, access 
control or availability) but the problem we tackle is, simply 
speaking, about authenticity and integrity. Furthermore, note 
we’re considering the two directions: both device and cloud 
exchange data that needs to be trusted data. 
IV. SCENARIOS 
In this section we describe our approach to use smart 
contracts to establish roots-of-trust. We start by considering 
three types of devices: (i) with a TPM, (ii) without a TPM but 
supporting tamper-detection and (iii) software-based 
attestation. We then elaborate on how smart contracts can 
enhance trust using three representative scenarios in the 
lifecycle of a device: (i) bootstrapping a newly manufactured 
device, (ii) software-attesting a device with no TPM but 
supporting tamper-detection after installation at an untrusted 
location and (iii) a smart meter reading. We then discuss our 
assumptions and the effectiveness of the approach. 
In the diagrams, we use the following notation: 
• a dashed line means detection of new state, after the 
blockchain consensus layer converged 
• Solid lines require interaction with the blockchain, thus 
changing the state of the contract 
• Changing the state of contract needs a public and 
private key pair (where the public key is often the 
address and identity of the device interfacing the 
contract) and an address of the contract itself. These are 
configurations that need to be present at the device 
from the beginning 
• We denote encryption of data with key key by 
key[data]. 
 
A. Bootstrapping a device 
We start by looking at a device that has just been 
manufactured, in terms of hardware, and is ready to be 
packaged and sent to either the final customer or to another 
party that will further configure or install software. We 
assume the device has, at this early stage, a firmware able to 
participate in attestation and tracking actions. We further 
assume the device has been configured with means to interact 
with a smart contract such as keys, an address, a whitelist of 
blockchain nodes and perhaps a token or cryptocurrency. 
See Figure 1. At this stage, the device actions two different 
contracts. The first contract supply_chain, which must be 
pre-existing and mutually managed between the manufacturer 
and any owners of the device, will track its journey and 
modifications until arriving the final location. The second 
contract, device, is created on-the-fly by the device and will 
track its authenticity and integrity. Note that, depending on the 
attestation method, it may not matter whether the device has 
the right firmware or configuration. If the device fails any 
verification, it is not accepted into its final use. The two 
contracts are expected to be linked but only at the beginning 
so the address of device can be found. 
The device checks-in for the first time with a factory 
identifier that we are calling here sn (thinking of a serial 
number). The Cloud counterpart, here representing any server 
infrastructure on the side of the (future) owner of the device, 
will detect a new device (denoted by a dashed line) once their 
blockchain nodes synchronise. Note this is not a directed 
message. The device will also register a public key (or a full 
 certificate, simply represented by pubD) for future private 
communications as will show and unique ID, guid. All these 
elements are generated locally by the device, either using a 
TPM or running normal software and the public elements are 
then published by executing a method in the smart contract 
running in the blockchain. 
The device is now ready to be verified and steps that require 
traceability are communicated using the blockchain. The 
Cloud also publishes its certificate (cert). At this stage, both 
device and Cloud have each other’s identity. The Cloud 
requires now an attestation to which the device confirms by 
sending a message directly. The firmware location (fwLoc) is 
sent, possibly encrypted with fwKey (which is sent encrypted 
with the Device’s public key), along with any other 
parameters (params) the device requires to run the attestation. 
If a software attestation is done, these parameters may include 
a checksum function and a prover binary, among others. The 
device fetches the firmware directly from a cloud server, 
installs and an attestation process is executed. Both parties 
record results on the blockchain. The results should be later 
checked for consistency. Finally, as the device changes hands, 
similar actions may take place thus recording any 
modifications using smart contracts. 
 
B. Device with tamper-detection 
This scenario has relevance in case of a device that has no 
means to verify the integrity of its hardware or software but 
has means to detect tampering to some satisfactory degree of 
trust. A simple solution is at the cost of physically destroying 
some functionality of the device. This scenario is challenging 
if only because once physical access has been breached, and in 
the absence of a trusted attestation process, it is virtually 
impossible to fully prevent modification by physical 
reprogramming.  
We nevertheless assume there was at some point a 
verification that could be, for example, a manual inspection. 
Further, we assume there is a trusted physical mechanism  
(such as switch) that, upon activation, will put the device in a 
lockdown mode disabling all external interfaces, not accepting 
any new software and only running a specific application that 
will interface the smart contract methods (Figure 2). As soon 
as the device detects physical violation, it will update the 
contract with a report and not allow any further action. This 
report needs to be acknowledged by the Cloud at which point 
the device could allow reduced operation depending on the 
policy object (policy) coming from the Cloud. The 
lockdown will be removed once a confirmation is read in the 
blockchain coming from the Cloud.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Bootstrapping a device. 
 
 
  
Figure 2. Tamper detection. 
 
 
Figure 3. Smart Reader scenario. 
 
 
C. Smart Meter reading 
Figure 3 shows a scenario where a device is using a secure 
protocol to update a value. Given this potentially involves 
private personal information (e.g., electricity readings), we 
need to support confidentiality and forward secrecy. The 
device starts by creating a temporary key: pubD’ is the public 
part that is stored in the contract and privD’ which is kept 
local to the device. For forward privacy, these keys are only 
used for this reading, and a random number to prevent replay 
attacks and confirm the specific reading order. The key is 
ephemeral and is used to protect the reading until confirmed 
storage when it is discarded. Note, however, that depending on 
the blockchain type information cannot be discarded as such 
but only revoked. 
D. Discussion 
A key feature these three use-cases highlight that can only 
be achieved with blockchains is that of a secure medium over 
which messages are passed and, to any arbitrary level, 
broadcasted to any number of nodes and as many as possible 
to improve both security and resilience. All three mechanisms 
can be done in a centralised fashion using pairs of nodes; for 
example, the location of the firmware can be negotiated over 
TLS. The problem with peer-to-peer protocols is that it 
typically needs a previous step to bootstrap trust, such as a list 
of certification authorities that must be known by both parties 
engaging in the protocol. A blockchain-enhanced architecture 
does significantly remove that need and essentially provide 
(pseudo-) centralised means to store unmodifiable information 
while being distributed in nature and thus resilient to any 
arbitrary level. A further advantage is that, for data that needs 
to be trusted, recorded and auditable at any point in the future, 
and by parties that do not trust each other, such as a smart-
meter reading that may be disputed at some point. 
It also provides verifiable means to handle functions that a 
typical TPM provides such as generation of keys, storage of 
state (such as hashes of firmware) or generation of random 
number. Naturally, private keys cannot be stored in the clear 
so they either need a public key counterpart or, if symmetric, 
need to be protected by a secret that needs to be stored locally 
thus vulnerable in the absence of a TPM. In any case, note that 
updating the smart contract needs a transaction (often paying 
with a cryptocurrency) which requires a secret key. 
A further advantage of using smart contracts is that even 
with TPMs some previous provisioning information needs to 
be securely shared prior to the device being provisioned and 
installed. When attesting a device, the measurements of the 
device need to be compared to a trusted template that is 
typically unique to the device when considering local 
configuration when devices are installed for a particular use or 
 user. A blockchain elegantly solves the problem from an 
architectural perspective even if storage of secret material 
such as keys needs hardware unless software-attestation is 
acceptable. A combination of both, however, TPM and 
blockchains, is able to create perfect security from an 
architectural perspective (i.e., excluding implementation 
vulnerabilities). 
A key challenge is, however, how devices will participate in 
the blockchain. There are two basic scenarios: passively 
reading updates to the blockchain (such as when the cloud 
publishes information) and actively executing or writing state 
in the blockchain.  
Regarding reading information, the ideal scenario is for the 
device itself to be a full node in the blockchain thus receiving 
and validating (but not mining) every new block. The 
contracts can therefore be inspected and executed locally as a 
copy exists. first is the device receiving full updates to 
changes in contracts, and all contracts active in the blockchain, 
thus being able to verify by itself state and consistency. This 
may depend on the chosen blockchain implementation, e.g., a 
public one such as Ethereum or a private and permissioned 
one with, in principle, weaker security since the security of a 
blockchain depends on its scale. In both cases, and depending 
on how constrained the device is, storing the full blockchain, 
or even just the current state and an integrity metric (similar to 
a hash of all transactions and block headers), requires vast 
amounts of storage that is blatantly incompatible to the typical 
IoT device. In other words, currently, one needs to rely on a 
trusted gateway which, despite typically existing in a IoT 
architecture, introduces a vulnerable point. Note however that 
the device may have a list of different nodes on the wider 
Internet (so outside the local network) that can be used to as 
uncorrelated sources (trusting the network links) to verify the 
state of a contract. Multiple nodes can be configured, along 
with public keys and well-known identities, and they either 
agree on the state of the contracts, after mined, or some may 
have been compromised and the perceived state, from the 
device’s perspective, cannot be trusted. In other words, and 
this is a strength of blockchains, in order to compromise the 
interface of the device with the blockchain, either the link is 
compromised (such as the gateway spoofing network 
responses) or most nodes in the list of the device need to be 
compromised. The overall problem is left for future work but 
current solutions point to an significant increase in the 
architectural complexity [12][15]. 
Writing, executing or updating a contracts seems simpler 
and is more of a problem of managing keys – which can be 
managed in similar ways as presented before. In the 
impossibility of a device being a full node, this needs the 
cooperation of a trusted set of nodes. The transactions that 
underpin the execution of a method in the smart contract 
require very little space (say, ~1 kByte). They are signed and 
authenticated in-band (or otherwise the transaction does not 
validate) and are sent to any node participating in the 
blockchain. In the worst case, the transaction needs to be 
repeated and any pending protocol is stalled. This may not be 
a critical problem since. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION 
In this section we discuss simplified code samples of smart 
contracts. We use Ethereum and the Solidity language. For 
simplicity of presentation and lack of space, we will omit 
unnecessary details in the code and Solidity syntax. 
 The first smart contract is shown in Figure 4 and 
implements part of the bootstrapping functionality of Device.  
Contracts in Ethereum pay for both storage (roughly the 
objects at the top and the constructor) and execution cycles 
(roughly the functions). Information that needs to be stored for 
the lifetime of the Device is, among other, its public key, a 
factory identification (such as a serial number) and the 
addresses of the parties that can interact the contract (the 
device and a counterpart server in the Cloud). 
The device first needs to generate a unique identifier 
(guid), e.g., from its serial number. It also needs to generate 
locally at least one public and private key pair (ideally a 
certificate) Keys should be generated from the TPM if 
existing. When first deploying the contract, the constructor 
will populate these objects. 
 
contract Device { 
//... 
Key publicKey; 
  string serialnumber, guid; 
  Address ownerDevice, ownerCloud; 
  AttestationResult attResDevice, attResCloud; 
 
  constructor() public { 
    ownerDevice = DEVICE_ADDRESS; 
    ownerCloud == CLOUD_SERVER_ADDRESS; 
    serialnumber = SERIAL_NUMBER; 
    publicKey[0] = PUBLIC_KEY_DEVICE; 
guid = GUID; 
  } 
 
  function decommission() public { 
    if (msg.sender == ownerDevice  
|| msg.sender == ownerCloud) 
selfdestruct( cloudAddress ); 
  } 
     
  function managePublicKey( party ); 
  function reqAttestat( Key pubC, Attestation att ); 
  function attest( Key fwKey, Url fw_url ); 
    
  function attestRes ( AttestResult r) { 
    if (msg.sender == ownerDevice) 
attResDevice == r; 
    if (msg.sender == ownerCloud)) 
attResCloud == r; 
  } 
} 
Figure 4. Bootstrapping pseudocode for contract Device. 
 The other methods are aligned with the signalling diagrams 
described before. The bootstrapping contract also implements 
access control in the form of allowed addresses. For example, 
when reporting the attestation result, only a (signed) 
transaction coming from the device’s address (ownerDevice) 
or a trusted server (ownerCloud) can update that information. 
 Figure 5 shows a simplified contract to report tampering 
detection. As explained, as soon as the device detects an 
 incident, we assume it activates a lockdown mode, record its 
state in the blockchain and will wait for a policy from the 
cloud server. The device will not change its state until the 
cloud counterpart sends a message, in the blockchain, to 
release the hardware. 
 
contract Device { 
  Key publicKey; 
  TamperReport tr; 
  Address ownerDevice, ownerCloud; 
  bool devLocked; 
 
  constructor() public { 
    ownerDevice = DEVICE_ADDRESS; 
    ownerCloud == CLOUD_SERVER_ADDRESS; 
    publicKey = PUBLIC_KEY_DEVICE; 
    tr.detected = devLocked = false; 
  } 
 
  function tamperReport() public { 
    if (msg.sender == ownerDevice) { 
      devLocked = tr.detected = true; 
      tr.nounce = random(); 
      tr.signed = sign(PUBLIC_KEY_DEVICE, tr); 
      //other tr attributes 
    } 
  } 
     
  function setTamperPolicy( TamperPolicy policy ); 
 
  function ackTamperPolicy() { 
    if ( msg.sender == ownerDevice )  
    tr.ackDevice = true; 
  }; 
 
  function tamperRelease( bool status ) { 
    if ( msg.sender == ownerCloud ) devLocked = 0; 
  } 
} 
Figure 5. Tamper-detection smart contract. 
 As expected, running these contracts is rather slow when 
compared with point-to-point protocols. We deployed and ran 
the contracts in a local Ethereum test network where no other 
contracts were being executed. This assured that every block 
was predictable given the low load in mining and 
confirmations occurred after about 15 seconds. Running a 
simple tamper-detection protocol took several minutes just for 
exchanging messages and updating the protocol state. 
Also, the full contracts themselves, both Device (more 
complex) and SupplyChain, were on the order of 1 kB and, 
hence, manageable. The transactions themselves, that devices 
can hold templates locally, would range between 150 bytes 
when recording just a flag (e.g., tamperRelease()) and a 
few kB for the case of recording a certificate. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
This paper offered an approach to use blockchains and 
smart contracts to enhance current methods of establishing a 
root-of-trust. We describe our approach and discuss its 
theoretical and practical feasibility. We also present a brief 
implementation for the Ethereum blockchain. Our approach 
raises further questions that our future work will address, 
which include implementing our proposal in an actual testbed 
with heterogeneous devices. A key open direction is how to 
integrate devices, which are likely to be constrained in some 
aspect, in a large blockchain such as Ethereum. This may have 
two approaches: designing a private blockchain architecture 
and, complementary, to combine the security of a distributed 
blockchain with conventional point-to-point techniques. This 
means putting a component of trust in external nodes which, in 
a IoT system likely involves a gateway. 
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